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Abstract: I criticize the tendency to address the causal role of awareness in agency in 
terms of the awareness of agency, and argue that this distorts the causal import of 
experimental results in significant ways. I illustrate, using the work of Shaun Gallagher, 
how the tendency to focus on the awareness of agency obscures the role of extrospective 
awareness by considering it only in terms of what it contributes to the awareness of 
agency. Focus on awareness of agency separates awareness from agency itself, and then 
turns it inwards to introspect distinct agentive processes. If we then assume that the 
causal influence of awareness is directed at the same object as awareness itself, then the 
only avenue for conscious causal involvement in action is to somehow interfere with the 
separate, even neuronal, processes leading to action. I label this the Micromanagement 
Model of conscious agency, because it forces awareness to micromanage other, 
nonconscious, processes in order to be causally efficacious. Implicit adherence to the 
Micromanagement Model prejudices us towards the mistaken conclusion that awareness 
has limited to no causal role in action.  
 
 
Introduction 
Based on new research in cognitive science in the last decade, a number of 
philosophers have concluded that we have little to no conscious causal influence on our 
own actions, and that our strong impressions to the contrary are simply persistent 
illusions. These strong conclusions are symptoms of a problematic view of conscious 
action, and it is this problematic view of how awareness might figure in action that is the 
target of this paper. My focus here is on the model of agency that underlies a fairly 
widespread tendency to take awareness of agency (alternatively, an experience, sense, or 
phenomenology of agency) as the paradigm for understanding conscious contributions to 
agency. Regardless of whether or not we endorse the problematic symptoms of this view 
(such as concluding that conscious awareness has no causal role in action), this model is 
agency is, I’ll show, dubious. 
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A number of authors utilize the sense or awareness of agency as a method for 
investigating the extent of the conscious causal contributions to action (Metzinger 2006; 
Velmans 2004; O’Shaughnessy 2003; Carruthers 2007; Nahmias 2005; Choudhury and 
Blakemore 2006; Wegner and Wheatley 1999; Haggard 2003). Two manifestations of 
this trend are, on the one hand, the notion that conscious awareness is involved in action 
as awareness of acting; and, on the other, that introspective reports by agents should 
reveal awareness of the mechanisms involved in the exercise of agency, if the agent was 
consciously involved in that exercise (Mossel 2005; Bayne and Levy 2006; Horgan, 
Tienson, and Graham 2003).1  
This focus has the effect of separating awareness from other, distinct, agentive 
processes, and then directing awareness at those processes. It effectively reduces the 
potential role of conscious awareness to that of a passive monitoring mechanism, 
producing introspective reports on already ongoing processes that are by themselves 
sufficient to lead to action. In light of such assumptions, the results of experiments such 
as Libet (1985) shouldn't really surprise us, since it is in the nature of such a monitoring 
mechanism to produce reports after the fact. Underlying the focus on the awareness of 
agency and assumption that introspective reports should reveal the mechanisms of action 
is a flawed model of agency that I will call the Micromanagement Model. On this model, 
awareness is introspectively directed at distinct agentive processes leading to action, and 
in order to exert any causal influence in action, awareness must somehow “fiddle with the 
knobs” of those other agentive processes. The causal role that the Micromanagement 
Model makes available for awareness is that of intervening in the nonconscious processes 
that lead to action. Holding awareness to such a skewed and strong standard to count as 
causally efficacious in action makes it overwhelmingly easy to conclude that our 
conscious selves play little to no causal role in producing our actions, whether or not 
actually endorses that view.  
                                                
1 There are philosophers (inter alia, Chalmers 1996, Newell 1992) who take there to be an important 
difference between awareness and conscious awareness, whereas I do not distinguish between these (and 
specifically avoid use of the term ‘consciousness’). For reasons of space, I will not make a philosophical 
defense here of my usage of these terms. It’s important to note, though, that in the scientific literature on 
which I rely, awareness and conscious awareness are used interchangeably. As my goal is provide an 
empirically grounded account of conscious agency, the extant science should guide usage of these terms. 
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The focus on the sense of agency has three specific shortcomings to be explored 
in this paper. First and most importantly, it directs the causal influence of awareness 
inward, towards our own internal processes leading to movement. This internal re-
direction separates awareness from agency and constitutes the fundamental error that 
gives rise to the Micromanagement Model of conscious agency. Second, while the sense 
of agency may allow us to infer the existence of conscious agency, we have reason to 
think that the processes leading to movement cause both movement and the sense of 
agency itself, and as such it could not be a causal factor in generating that movement. If 
we consider extrospective awareness only in terms of what it contributes to the sense of 
agency, we have essentially eliminated the substantive avenues by which awareness 
could causally contribute to action. Finally, the focus on sense of agency ties the causal 
role of conscious awareness too closely to the ability to provide introspective reports 
regarding one’s own agency, making it a necessary condition for awareness having been 
causally involved that we be aware of the separate process leading to action. 
My claim is neither that there is nothing worthwhile to be found by looking at the 
sense of agency, nor that all the authors who discuss it also endorse the 
Micromanagement Model. My argument is that the level to which we have focused on 
the sense of agency obscures the causal role of nonintrospective awareness in action. The 
MM need not be a position endorsed as such by any given philosopher, but I am claiming 
that it is the underlying model that goes along with the sense of agency as a means of 
investigating conscious action, and that it is what provides apparent plausibility to many 
of the existing positions regarding conscious agency.  
Section 1 illustrates how the focus on awareness of agency distorts the causal role 
of awareness in action by assimilating nonintrospective aspects of awareness to the sense 
of agency; I do this by looking a representative case in the work of Shaun Gallagher. 
Section 2 generalizes the focus on sense of agency and reliance on introspective reports, 
to demonstrate how such a focus leads to the Micromanagement Model of conscious 
agency.  
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Section 1 
In this section, I want to show how a focus on sense of agency is so strong that it 
leads to assimilation of other world-directed, extrospective, aspects of awareness to the 
sense of awareness. The extrospective aspects become relevant only insofar as they 
contribute to the awareness of agency, and not as potential causal factors in their own 
right. This segues in to section 2 by demonstrating how such a focus turns awareness 
inwards towards one’s own, sometimes nonconscious, agentive processes. 
Recent work by Shaun Gallagher emphasizes the role of the sense of agency in 
action by developing a distinction between the sense of ownership of action (that it is 
oneself which moves or thinks) and the sense of agency (that one is the originator or 
source of this movement or thinking). For Gallagher, the sense of agency, the feeling that 
one is the causal source of an action, is closely tied to the immunity principle, that we are 
immune to making identificational errors, either in propositions or more broadly in 
experience, that involve attributions to ourselves as a first person pronoun (Gallagher 
2000, 4). This connection draws the sense of agency into extremely close contact with 
introspective reports of the experience of acting. In one regard, that closeness of 
connection is appropriate: the sense of agency is a kind of feeling one has about oneself, 
a feeling on which one can provide reports. The problem is then going on to use the sense 
of agency to stand in for agency itself. The sense of agency is itself compatible with 
either the presence or absence of conscious causal involvement in the action. The very 
way in which the distinction between sense of ownership and of agency is framed 
separates the awareness of agency from the object of that awareness, agency itself. This 
distinction first separates awareness from agency, which is the basic move that leads to 
the Micromanagement Model. 
Gallagher (2007) states that it is the sense of agency that gives us insight into 
conscious causal contributions to action. His aim “is to investigate both the 
phenomenology and science of agency. In its proper sense, I understand agency to 
depend on the agent’s consciousness of agency” (Gallagher 2007, 2). He focuses on the 
sense of agency as the way to understand conscious contributions to actions, even though 
he also mentions other aspects of conscious involvement in action beyond the sense of 
agency: 
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…clearly our sense of agency for the action will be tied to that intentional aspect, 
and that aspect is where our attention is directed – in the world, in the project or 
task that we are engaged in. So clearly a form of intentional feedback, which is 
not afferent feedback about our bodily movements, but some perceptual sense that 
my action is having an effect, must contribute to the sense of agency. 
I suggest, then, that the sense of agency, at the first-order level of 
experience, is complex because it is the product of several contributory elements: 
efferent signals, sensory (afferent) feedback, and intentional (perceptual) 
feedback. (Gallagher 2007, 8) 
 
There are two key ideas in this passage. The first is the mention of distinct ways 
in which conscious awareness could be involved in action; in particular, attention is 
directed out into the world, not merely at our own bodily movements and sensory 
feedback. This direction of awareness out into the world is distinct from our awareness of 
agency, and it is precisely what is neglected by the focus on the sense of agency. That 
neglect is evident in this passage, because although he brings up these other ways in 
which awareness in involved in action, Gallagher considers them only in terms of how 
they relate to the sense of agency. Instead of looking at the causal involvement of world-
directed or extrospective awareness itself, he considers world-directed awareness only in 
terms of what it contributes to the sense of agency. Gallagher ends up ignoring the 
possibility that extrospective awareness may have a causal contribution to action distinct 
from its contribution to the sense of agency. Assimilating other aspects of awareness to 
phenomenology of agency is problematic because the very way in which the experience 
of agency is separated from agency removes it from the causal processes leading to 
action. This separation of experience of agency from agency per se deprives conscious 
awareness any real causal role in that agency itself aside from what could be exercised on 
that agency by awareness. 
This passage also illustrates why focusing on the awareness of agency distorts the 
picture we get of the causal contribution of awareness to action. The sense of agency 
likely arises from, or is strongly influenced by, the same neural processes that also lead to 
motor action. A probable candidate for what gives rise to the awareness of agency is a 
copy of the efferent signal that goes out to muscles in order to move. But this connection 
between efferent signals and the sense of agency prejudges the question of causal 
involvement of awareness. If we take the sense of agency to be the primary way in which 
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awareness is involved in action, then we find that it always follows motor processes, 
never causing them. This is no surprise. We have already eliminated any possible causal 
role for awareness by making it a common effect: one process leads both to movement 
and to the sense of agency. If we then absorb the other avenues by which conscious 
awareness could be causally involved in action into the sense of agency, as Gallagher 
does, we are led to the conclusion that awareness has no substantive causal role in any 
given movement. But we are not led to this conclusion by the scientific results 
themselves; we are led to it by the scientific results conjoined with an exclusive focus on 
the sense of agency, and a failure to sufficiently consider other possible aspects of 
conscious involvement in action. 
If research on the sense of agency is taken to illuminate the causal role of 
conscious agency, the game is already up before the experiment begins. The premotor 
processes leading to action will always be a necessary condition for awareness of agency, 
which means that by the time we are aware of agency, the neuronal preparations for 
movement are already in full swing. It precludes awareness of agency from occurring 
before these processes are engaged. Once again, we see that if this is the only potential 
causal role for conscious awareness, then the reasonable conclusion to draw is that there 
is no such causal efficacy. But there is no justification for the philosophical moves that 
make it seem as if this is the only potential causal role for conscious awareness to play. 
In sum: Gallagher assimilates other aspects of awareness, including perceptual 
awareness of the details of what one is doing, to the conscious sense of agency. Other 
forms of awareness feed into the conscious sense of agency by providing mechanisms by 
which we monitor our actions and compare them against intentions and goals, so as to 
make corrections when needed. But this ultimately ignores the causal roles played by 
these other aspects of conscious awareness insofar as they are not solely giving rise to the 
sense of agency. Gallagher’s (2007) goal is to review the scientific study of agency and 
what it contributes to our understanding of agency from philosophy. By ignoring other 
forms of conscious involvement and considering this question only with regards to the 
sense of agency, however, will lead us to think that awareness has at best a subsidiary 
involvement in movement. 
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Section 2 
Conscious awareness and causality are both commonly described in terms of a 
certain kind of directionality. This shared feature makes it easy to conflate the two, yet 
the directional relation in the two cases is markedly different. In order to get at the 
question of whether and in what ways awareness is causally influential in action, the 
‘arrow’ of intentionality of awareness must be distinguished from the ‘arrow’ of causal 
influence. Both of these arrows must be kept track of, but kept track of separately. 
 This point is straightforward but deserves to be carefully put. An intrinsic feature 
of awareness is that it is awareness of something. Awareness has content and by dint of 
that content, can be thought of as directed at something, its object.2 The object of 
awareness, that at which awareness is directed, can vary greatly. We are capable of being 
aware of, having awareness directed at, features of the world: I am aware of the coffee 
cup on the table. It can be directed at features of the body: I am aware of being hungry. 
Awareness can be introspective, by having as its object features of experience itself: I am 
aware of feeling distracted by the noise outside. 
The basic problem with the dominant approach is that it utilizes awareness as it is 
directed at one’s own agency. This is an introspective awareness – the object of 
awareness is the agency in question. This is true whether we think of the sense of agency 
as a primitive feature of experience, or as a higher-order reflective awareness. Because 
when we pose the general question of whether, and if so how, conscious awareness is 
causally efficacious in our actions, there is a separate element of directionality invoked, 
namely, that of causation. There is a tempting analogy between the arrow of direction of 
awareness and the arrow of causal influence. Unless one explicitly considers these two 
distinct modes of directionality, it is easy to simply assume they are the same: that the 
direction of awareness is the same as that of causal influence; or that, even if the two 
arrows are not identical, they must point in the same direction. In combination with a 
focus on the sense or awareness of agency, we get the odd result that awareness must 
somehow act on separate agentive processes if it is to act on anything at all. 
                                                
2 This notion of intentionality was introduced by Brentano, and is quite widespread and basic, but it bears 
repeating so as to highlight the contrast with causation. 
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The central picture is this: if we focus on the awareness of agency and we think 
that the causal influence of awareness is directed at the same object as is the awareness 
itself, then what we get is a navel-gazing causal picture. The awareness of agency is 
introspective. When this introspective view of conscious agency is combined with the 
conflation of the object of awareness and causal influence, we get what I call the 
Micromanagement Model of conscious agency: if awareness is to be causally efficacious 
in action, it must somehow reach down into the bowels of the brain and fiddle with the 
knobs. In order to have a causal effect on action, awareness must be directed at and then 
change some otherwise ongoing, unconscious process, perhaps a brute physical process, 
that is in ourselves and that is leading to the action.  
Put this way, it is an obviously silly view: why should awareness have to be 
directed at our own brain processes in order to make a causal difference? That is why the 
moniker is appropriate – it assumes that our conscious selves would have to 
micromanage the details of how our total selves are going about the business of moving 
around. But, while this way of putting it highlights the absurdity of such a view, this is 
what we naturally fall into thinking by failing to distinguish the two relevant 
directionalities and then focusing on the awareness of agency. This double-move 
separates our awareness of agency from the agency itself, and then turns awareness 
inwards to monitor our own agentive processes, so that awareness must somehow 
influence our own agency to be causally efficacious.  
Let’s see exactly what goes into this view. The Micromanagement Model of 
conscious agency, the generalized view of conscious agency that emerges from the focus 
on the awareness of agency, can be characterized as follows: if conscious awareness has a 
causal influence on action, and the relevant aspect of awareness is that which is directed 
at our own agency, then any causal influence of awareness in agency will be on agency. 
Our awareness is directed at and acts on our own agentive processes. 
 The MM has a fairly immediate epistemic consequence for how we should 
investigate conscious causal influence. If awareness is directed at the processes leading to 
action, then we should be aware of the elements of those processes. The contrapositive 
also follows: insofar as we fail to be aware of some causal factor involved in action, then 
awareness must not have been directed at those processes. That awareness failed to be 
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directed at some element of the relevant processes means, under the MM model, that 
awareness was not causally involved in the action that resulted from those processes. 
Thus, it becomes a necessary condition for awareness having been causally involved that 
we be aware of the separate processes leading to action. This use of introspection to get at 
the mechanisms of action is the Epistemic Consequence of MM: if there is conscious 
causal influence in action, then awareness should be able to provide introspective reports 
on the causal influences on action, because it is introspectively directed at the processes 
by which such actions occur.  
 The Micromanagement Model allows for the possibility of awareness directed at 
agency without thereby also being causally involved in agency; awareness of agency is 
not a sufficient condition for causal involvement. But it does make introspective 
awareness a necessary condition for causal influence: when awareness of agency fails, 
because we lack introspective access to some causal factor involved in the exercise of 
agency, this indicates a failure of conscious causal involvement in action. On this view, 
we cannot be causally efficacious conscious agents unless we are also able to provide 
introspective reports of how we wield that influence. 
This assumption of a need for accurate introspective reports of the mechanisms of 
agency in order for conscious awareness to count as causally efficacious in action can be 
found in Gazzaniga (1998, 2000), Wegner (2002), Nisbett and Wilson (1977), and in 
most of Benjamin Libet’s work, as well as that of authors who use his work to establish 
limitations on the causal efficacy of awareness in action (Haggard and Eimer 1999). 
What these positions share is the assumption that conscious agency is dependent on 
introspective access. Insofar as we lack conscious access to the mechanisms by which we 
act, or to factors that influence our action, or to the nonconscious processes that lead to 
action, we are causally inefficacious as conscious agents.  
The separation of agency from awareness of agency is a crucial condition for the 
Micromanagement Model. Under this view, awareness, whether or not it is causally 
efficacious in action, is outside of the flow of an otherwise self-sufficient process leading 
to action. The implicit idea seems to be that there are neuronal processes which lead up to 
movement; every action involves some kind of movement; and so in order for conscious 
awareness to be causally involved in producing an action, it must be causally influential 
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on those processes which are already leading up to the movement which constitutes the 
action. This leaves the possible effects of awareness as directed at and changing features 
of these otherwise sufficient processes leading to movement. This is why I call it 
Micromanagement: nonconscious processes are already in gear leading up to action, and 
if awareness is to be causally involved, its influence must be on precisely those processes 
already leading to action. Awareness must reach down into the brain, as it were, and poke 
at processes already in motion. If we start by thinking that awareness is directed at our 
own agency, it is a short slide to the requirement that it be causally efficacious by acting 
on that agency at which it is already directed. Once we accept something like this 
requirement, we naturally assume that awareness must have access to the causally 
relevant factors leading to action, since it is already directed at those processes (is 
awareness of that agency). And this provides a convenient but, I claim, mistaken way to 
establish whether or not conscious awareness is involved in any given action: by seeing if 
we can produce introspective reports of our awareness of all the factors that influenced 
some behavior. 
This overall MM view and its epistemic consequence manifest in a variety of 
philosophical approaches to conscious agency. Under MM, the possible stances on the 
causal involvement of conscious awareness in agency are quite limited: leaving 
awareness out of the loop entirely, so we are unaware of what is happening and not 
causally involved in it (see Gazzaniga 1998); construing awareness as able to report on 
these processes without affecting them, (see Wegner 2002); or treating awareness as 
reporting on processes while also interfering with them (thus micromanaging the 
processes already leading to action). This latter view is not advocated as such by any 
author, and for a very good reason: it is extremely improbable that conscious awareness 
somehow reaches down into the brain and fiddles with lower level processes in order to 
exert causal influence. The point, however, is that once we start thinking of conscious 
agency in terms of awareness of agency, the last option is the only one which leaves 
awareness with any genuinely efficacious role in action. But it is only because of implicit 
acceptance of something like the Micromanagement Model that this strange option is the 
only one left where conscious awareness has causal efficacy in action. If we assume 
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something like the MM, the only sensible thing to do is to deny a causal role to conscious 
awareness.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Gallagher is only one example of a broad trend in contemporary philosophy of 
psychology that addresses conscious agency by focusing on the sense or awareness of 
agency. This has the effect of separating awareness from agency so that awareness can 
then be turned inwards and directed at our own agency. This focus on the sense of agency 
is sometimes combined with the recognition that awareness is involved in action in other 
ways than as sense of acting, but too often these other avenues of involvement are 
considered only in terms of what they contribute to the sense of agency.  
I have argued that the focus on awareness of agency as the relevant target for 
investigating the causal efficacy of conscious agency is misplaced. This dominant focus 
can be generalized as the Micromanagement Model, in which conscious awareness is 
assumed to be introspectively or internally directed, to reach down into the brain and alter 
ongoing neuronal processes, and, as an epistemic consequence, to be able to provide a 
report of those processes in order to be counted as genuinely causal. When we fail to find 
these features of conscious influence in experimental results, many authors have claimed 
that this failure provides empirical justification for the position that conscious agency is 
illusory, inefficacious, or generally confabulatory. I have shown that these conclusions do 
not follow from the evidence itself, but instead from an assumption about how conscious 
awareness could be involved, namely as awareness of agency. The Micromanagement 
Model makes sense of both the tendency to focus on the awareness or sense of agency, 
and the importance placed on instances of failures of introspective awareness regarding 
factors that are known to be influential on behavior, both of which are commonly seen in 
current discussions on conscious agency. It also clearly illustrates why we should take 
care to avoid this way of thinking about the causal contributions of awareness to agency. 
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